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COMMENTS
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS AS THE SUBJECT OF A TAKING'
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The plaintiff was an irrigation district organized under the laws
of the State of California. In 1932 and each year thereafter, the
plaintiff constructed a diversion dam about three or four feet high
across the Bear River by scraping up gravel on either side and plac-
ing it across the river. This dam would raise the level of the water
to the point where it would flow into canals on each side of the river.
Each fall, after the irrigation season, the plaintiff would cut the tem-
porary dam and allow the winter floods to wash it away. This process
was repeated each year. Plaintiff did not own any lands at this point
on either side of the river and none of the owners of the lands had
ever formally granted any easement or other interest to the plaintiff
authorizing it to build such a diversion dam. The plaintiff operated
under a claim of right based upon a vague assumption, and its ac-
tions were open and notorious, although no formal notice of the
asserted easement was given to anyone. The plaintiff claimed that
by the annual construction and use of the dversion dam from 1932
to 1943 it had acquired a prescriptive right or easement for such
purposes under the laws of California. Beginning in September, 1942,
United States Government contractors began removing gravel for
Army use from the river bed below the plaintiff's diversion dam.
Eighty thousand tons of gravel were removed from points between
one hundred and sixteen hundred feet below the dam. The plaintiff
claimed that by removing the gravel in this manner the defendant,
the United States Government, had caused the stream bed to be low-
ered to such an extent that the plaintiff could no longer divert water
by means of the small gravel dam, and this action amounted to a
taking by the defendant of the plaintiff's valuable right or easement.
Plaintiff sued for $51,156.81, the cost of a new concrete dam built
on the site, plus an allowance for maintenance. Held: plaintiff had
acquired a prescriptive right as claimed, but there was no taking
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the prescriptive ease-
ment thus acquired. Camp Far West Irrigation District v. United
States, 68 F. Supp. 908 (Court of Claims, 1946).
The question as to whether the plaintiff had acquired a prescrip-
tive right to construct and maintain the annual diversion dams was
settled without too much trouble. Originally, the courts adopted a
fiction that a grant of the right would be presumed if it had been
exercised for a period of twenty years, this doctrine of a lost grant
being in reality prescription, under another name. In this country
however, the courts have generally followed the analogy of the statute
of limitations applicable to actions for recovery of land, with the
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effect that one who has exercised as of right a user in another's land
for the statutory period is regarded as having a right of user to that
extent, the length of the period of prescription changing as the statu-
tory period is changed. The presumption of a grant is in effect a
positive rule of law, and evidence that no grant was made would be
inadmissible. In other words, it is conclusively presumed from the
landowner's acquiescence for the statutory period in the other's user
of his land, he having the right and power to stop such user, that
it is a rightful user.'
Section 325 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, re-
quiring an adverse possession for a period of five years in order to
acquire title to real estate, has been construed by the courts of Cali-
fornia as being applicable to rights by prescription as well. The ele-
ments required to make out such an adverse possession under the Code
are: (1) the possession must be by actual occupation, open and no-
torious, not clandestine; (2) it must be hostile to the owner's title;
(3) it must be held under a claim of title, exclusive of any other
right, as one's own; (4) it must be continuous and uninterrupted
for a period of five years prior to the commencement of the action.2
Thus, clear and satisfactory evidence that a right has been exercised
for more than five years openly, notoriously, visibly, continuously,
and without protest, opposition or denial of right to do so creates
a prima facie title to the easement by prescription.
Since it is the recognition of a right in the landowner to put an
end to the user which deprives the user of the element of adverse-
ness, and such recognition is in its nature an affirmative fact, the
burden of proof in reference thereto is properly on the landowner;
that is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the user of an-
other's land is ordinarily presumed to be adverse.3
It was early held in Wisconsin that when a person claiming an
easement by adverse user introduced evidence to show that the use
of the way had in fact been made, it would be presumed that such
use was adverse unless it was affirmatively shown by the owner of
the land to be a permissive use under contract or other agreement.
The plaintiff need not have a specific intent to deprive the owner
of the property, but merely the intent to use the property without
regard to the owner's rights.4 Actual knowledge on the owner's part
need not be shown, it being sufficient that the user is so visible and
1 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. IV, Sec. 1191, (1939).2Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 12 P. 491 (1886); Fleming v. Howard, 150
Cal. 28, 87 P. 908 (1906); Wallace v. Whitmore, 47 Cal. App. 2d 369, 117 P.
2d 926 (1941).
s Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. IV, Sec. 1196a, (1939).
4 Maloney, "Easements-Prescription by Adverse User," 9 Wisc. L. Rev. 107(1933).
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notorious that, in the exercise of due diligence, he would learn thereof.
The periodic absence of use of the claimed easement by plaintiff
during the winter months in the case at bar was held not to affect
its acquisition of a prescriptive easement. An omission to use when
not needed does not disprove a continuity of use, shown by using
it when needed.6
An easement involves primarily the privilege of doing a certain
class of acts on, or to the detriment of, another's land; or a right
against another that he refrain from doing a certain class of acts
on or in connection with his own land. Thus, easements (as dis-
tinguished from natural rights) may be of two kinds: affirmative
easements which authorize the doing of acts which, if no easement
existed, would give rise to a right of action, or in other words in-
volve the creation of a privilege; and negative easements which do
not authorize the doing of an act by the person entitled to the ease-
ment but merely preclude the owner of the land subject to the ease-
ment from doing the act which, if no easement existed, he would be
entitled to "do.7 In the instant case the plaintiff claimed both an
affirmative easement to build the dam, and also a negative easement
which precluded the landowners from removing amounts of gravel
from below the diversion dam which would damage the dam.
Under a case involving a negative easement, it is impossible for
the required cause of action to accrue in favor of the alleged servient
owner to prevent the privileged acts. Because of this, there is a com-
pelling logical reason that prevents the acquisition of negative ease-
ments by prescription.8
The expression "natural rights" as distinguished from the term
"easements" is used to describe the different phases of the general
right in a landowner freely to enjoy the use of his land in its natural
condition, without interference by his neighbors.9
The court decided that the removal of gravel by the defendant
could not be construed as a taking of the plaintiff's natural rights.
The court stated:
"Even if plaintiff had been the owner in fee of the land
upon which the diversion dam was erected, the removal of
gravel from the stream bed some hundreds of feet downstream
would not violate any natural right of plaintiff in the dam
5 Abbott v. Pond, 142 Cal. 393, 76 P. 60 (1904); Bernstein v. Dodik, 129 Cal.
App. 454, 18 P. 2d 983 (1933).6 Hesperia Land & Water Co. v. Rogers, 83 Cal. 10, 23 P. 196, 17 Am.St.Rep.
209 (1890).7 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. III, Sec. 756, (1939).
8 Cook, "Legal Analysis in the Law of Prescriptive Easements," 15 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 44 at 59 (1941).9 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed., Vol. III, Sec. 714-715 and
757, (1939).
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site recognized by law. The evidence as to the plaintiff's pre-
scriptive user of the land . . .would not warrant a finding
that plaintiff had by this same user succeeded to such sup-
posed natural right of said parties (the landowners) in the
land made servient to the diversion dam easement, as a basis
for claiming that this natural right had been taken."
The right claimed was that there was a natural right in the
owner of an upper portion of a stream bed that the downstream
owner should not so use his portion of the stream as to increase
the normal erosion and lowering of the upper stream bed. Actually,
the prescriptive right claimed here was an easement in gross, which
exists where there is no dominant tenement. It is little more than
an irrevocable license.'0
The court went on to say that when legal consideration is given
to the plaintiff's rights against the United States for the consequent
damage to the dam resulting from the removal of the gravel down-
stream, a principle other than that obtaining between private parties
comes into play. In such a case the Constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken without just compensation; but a dis-
tinction has been made between damage and taking, and that dis-
tinction must be observed in applying the constitutional provisions."
The application of this doctrine by the Supreme Court is shown by
two lines of decisions as based on the factual situation involved. One
set of decisions makes a strict construction of, and the other takes
a liberal view of, the term "taking" in the Fifth Amendment.
In Bedford v. United States, the plaintiff's lands were damaged
by the overflow and erosion resulting from the building of Govern-
ment flood control works on the Mississippi River above the plain-
tiff's land. The court held that such government action was not a
taking of private property for public use within the Fifth Amend-
ment. It was said that the damages, if they could be assigned to
the works at all, were but an incidental consequence of them. In
Gibson v. United States,3 the plaintiff's landing on a river was ren-
dered useless as the result of Government works in connection with
navigation improvements. The court held that no right to claim
damages was thereby given. In another case involving indirect dam-
age to the plaintiff's property,'4 it was said that acts done in the
proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroach-
ing upon private property, though their consequences may impair its
10 Zollmann, Tiffany on Real Property, Sec. 525, p. 530, (1940).
"Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 at 224, 24 S. Ct. 238, 48 L.Ed. 414(1903).
12 Ibid.
"3Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 41 L.Ed. 996, 17 S.Ct. 578 (1896).1A Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 25 L.Ed. 336 (1878).
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use, are universally held not be a taking within the meaning of the
constitutional provision.
In a recent case, United States v. Willow River Power Co.,"'
the court stated that an owner of a dam and hydroelectric plant on
a navigable stream was not entitled to compensation for a reduction
in the generating capacity of the plant, which resulted from an au-
thorized improvement that raised the level of the water of the stream
above ordinary high-level mark. Even where damages resulted from
an unforeseen flooding of plaintiff's soda lakes following construc-
tion and operation of a government irrigation project, it was held
that as no intentional taking of plaintiff's property could be implied,
the government was not liable ex contractu even assuming such causal
relation 1 6
The constitutional guaranty requires compensation only where
property is actually taken, and not where it is merely damaged, or
otherwise diminished in value, or its use restrictedY'
The liberal construction of "taking" is illustrated in the early
case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,' s where it was decided that the
permanent flooding of private property would be regarded as a tak-
ing. The court stated:
"It is not necessary that property should be absolutely taken,
in the narrowest sense of the word, to bring the case within
the protection of the constitutional provision; but there may
be such serious interruption to the common and necessary use
of property as will be equivalent to taking, within the meaning
of the statute. The backing of water so as to overflow the
lands of an individual, or any other superinduced addition of
water, earth, sand or other material, or artificial structure placed
on land, if done under statutes authorizing it for the public
benefit, is such a taking as, by the constitutional provisions,
demands compensation."
Later, in 1902, the case of United States v. Lynah'9 held that
the turning of a valuable rice plantation into an irreclaimable and
valueless bog, as the result of an improvement in navigation by the
United States Government, is a taking of the land, within the mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment. Again, in United States v. Cress,2
the court stated that where the Federal Government by means of
a lock and dam raised the water above the natural level so that the
plaintiff's lands were subjected permanently to periodical overflows
15 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 65 S. Ct. 761 (1945).
16Horstmann v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 42 S. Ct. 58, 66 L.Ed. 171 (1921).
'7Vol. 20, Corpus Juris, Sec. 138, p. 669 (1920); "Eminent Domain-Damage
Without Taking," 32 Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1944); "Constitutional Law-Eminent
Domain," 18 N. C. L. Rev. 43 (1939).
18 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1872).
'9 United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 23 S. Ct. 349, 47 L.Ed. 539 (1902).
20 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 37 St. Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1916).
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which substantially injured, though not destroyed, their value, there
was a partial taking of the property and the United States was there-
fore liable to compensate the owner to the extent of the injury.
The case at bar was distinguished from the above cases on the
ground that there was in those cases a direct physical invasion and
appropriation which was absent here.
"*. the removal of gravel, involved no direct encroachment
on plaintiff's diversion dam, quite aside from the question
whether the ultimate consequence of its act may have im-
paired its use as it then existed. The conception of what con-
stitutes an invasion and appropriation of the private owner's
domain is broadened, but the necessity of a taking is adhered
to, and the appropriation or taking upon which the right to
compensation is made dependent is an intentional appropria-
tion of the private party's property, even though the property
conceived to be taken is of an incorporeal nature."
Where land is merely damaged by the impairment of its use or
value as an incidental consequence of the lawful exercise of power
by the government, there is no taking.21 There must be some impli-
cation of a promise to make the compensation required where there
is an intentional taking of private property for public use.
In answer to the plaintiff's claim that a negative easement had
been acquired as against the servient landowners which withdrew
their right to use the gravel in the river bed below its dam, the
court stated that the findings would not support such a conclusion.
The decision concludes with the observation that although the removal
of gravel by the defendant may have brought about in substantial part
the necessity to replace the dam in 1943, even without that con-
tributing factor the stream bed would have ultimately washed and
eroded to such a depth that plaintiff would have found the gravel
dam ineffective.
As early as 1859, Sedgwick argued that this limitation of the
term 'taking' to the actual physical appropriation of property or a
divesting of title is too narrow a construction to answer the purposes
of justice.22
Considerations of policy should control. If from the standpoint
of policy it is desirable that a citizen have compensation, there should
be no hesitation in awarding it to him.23 It would seem more equitable
to allow compensation for such damage caused by the government,
21 Vansant v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 562 at 567; Jackson v. United States, 230
U.S. 1 (1912); Mills v. United States. 46 F. 738 (1891); Tempel v. United
States, 248 U.S. 121 (1918) ; United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386
(1944).
22 Sedgwick, "Statutory and Constitutional Law," p. 519 (1857).
23 Cormack, "Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain," 41 Yale L.J. 221
(1931).
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thus implementing a constitutional policy that the burden of the de-
struction of the individual's valuable property interests for the public
good should not rest upon him alone.2
The statement made by Justice Miller in Pumpelly v, Green Bay Co.
seems to express this view especially well.25
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if, in
construing a provision of constitutional law, always under-
stood to have been adopted for protection and security to the
rights of the individual as against the government, and which
had received the commendation of jurists, statesmen, and com-
mentators as placing the just principles of the common law
on that subject beyond the power of ordinary legislation to
change or control them, it shall be held that if the govern-
ment refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public, it can destroy its value entirely, can
inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent; can, in
effect, subject to total destruction without making any com-
pensation, because in the narrowest sense of that word it has
not been taken for the public use."
NORMAN W. WEGNER
2 4 
"Eminent Domain-When Is Property Taken," 52 Harv. L.Rev. 1176 at 1177
(1939) ; Portsmouth v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v.
Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 28 L.R.A., (N.S.) 385 (1909).
25 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1872).
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